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Abstract. This chapter is devoted to field studies and the aspects related to this 
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overview of some field data repositories available to the public. 
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1 Introduction 
Field measurements refer to observations of systems in the operational phase, i.e., 
systems that are actually in use. The results obtained from these observations have the 
very important characteristic of being realistic: the operation conditions and 
environment, and the workload are not mere experimental approximations. Very 
often, field studies are not representative as there is no guarantee that all possible, 
important system configurations have been observed. Nevertheless, field 
measurements and field data are a unique and very important source of information 
for researchers when studying the resilience properties, such as availability, reliability 
and robustness. 
There are basically two main driving forces behind the collection of field data: 
development and research. The first is committed to the improvement of specific 
systems and to solve problems on those specific systems that are discovered during 
the operational phase. The second driving force aims to understand the issues related 
to systems reliability and dependability and to propose new techniques to increase the 
reliability of non-specific (non vendor-specific) systems. A third driving force is a 
market-driven one, to promote awareness of a given product (e.g., network providers, 
such as sprint and AT&T, publish their performance and dependability data to 
promote the company and attract new customers). However, the first two driving 
forces are those more relevant to research works. 
The research driving force, although not tied to specific vendors or industry goals, 
is necessarily dependent on the existence of data. These data is mainly that which was 
collected by users or operators and is not related to any research goal. Thus, so far, the 
main origin of field data is the occurrence of incidents. This fact has an overwhelming 
impact on the nature of the available data, which is mainly related to computer 
failures and security incidents. To demonstrate the importance of field measurement 
and what can be achieved, in this chapter we present two case studies: the first on 
software faults and the second related to security vulnerabilities. 
The most complex and error prone components of computer-based systems are the 
software. Understanding software faults is essential to devise mechanisms to mitigate 
faults existing in software. Thus, the first case study presented in this chapter is a field 
study on software faults aimed at the characterization of software faults for emulation 
and fault injection purposes.  
Security issues are currently one of the major concerns surrounding software 
systems. Networking is one of the scenarios that most exposes a system to the general 
public and potential malicious users and attacks, representing a high relation with 
security-related incidents. Web-based systems are currently the basis of the majority 
of network-enabled systems. The second case study presented is thus related to 
security vulnerabilities.  
Although field data (field measurements) are highly relevant to the research 
community to understand and improve computer-based systems robustness, reliability 
and security, the availability of such data remains hard to guarantee. The few data 
available are based on open-source projects and published research works. The 
importance of field data is widely recognized among researchers as shown in 
workshops such as RAF07: Reliability Analysis of System Failure Data organized by 
Microsoft Research in Cambridge and Darmstadt University in 2007. Each open-
source development team or research team presents its own data and its own view. 
One important initiative to mitigate the scarcity and fragmented view of field data is 
the development of public repositories, to store data and results based on that data 
originating from many sources and teams. We include in this chapter a brief overview 
of available data repositories. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents a field study on 
software faults. Section 3 presents a field study on security vulnerabilities. An 
overview of field data repositories is presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes this 
chapter. 
2 Case study 1: Field data on software faults 
This section presents a field study on real software faults. This case study was 
conducted to understand the nature of faults, and to obtain a classification scheme 
usable for fault injection. Injecting faults is a time-proved method of validating fault 
tolerant mechanisms and assess system robustness. Given the relevance of software 
faults, it is very relevant to be able to inject software faults. The usefulness of fault 
injection is tied to the representativeness of the faults injected. To that aim, we need 
to understand what exactly is a software fault (a clear, but detailed description usable 
for automated fault injection), and obtain information on the types of faults that 
represent the faults more common in the operational scenario. The case study 
presented here is a summarized description of that field study. More details can be 
found in [1]. A technique to emulate software faults at the binary executable was 
proposed based on the findings of this study (G-SQFIT, see [1]), however, the details 
of such technique do not fit in a field study description and it is not presented here.  
Section 2.1 presents the source of the software faults used in this case study and 
details the methodology used for the classification of the faults. Section 2.2 presents a 
first overview of the fault distribution and makes a comparative analysis with the field 
study done by Christmansson and Chillarege in [2] using the ODC classification [3,4] 
scheme. Section 2.3 presents an overview of the details classification of the collected 
faults. Some conclusions about this field study are presented in Section 2.4.  
2.1 Sources of real software faults and classification methodology 
To address the representativeness issue of our study, we collected a large set of real 
software faults from software used in the field. The goal was to improve the 
knowledge about the exact nature of faults and their occurrence distribution using 
data from the real operational scenario. More specifically, the software faults that are 
pertinent to emulate by fault injection are those that originated in the coding phase 
and eluded the testing procedures and go with the deployed product. 
The information source used in our work was a set of diff/patch files for several 
open source programs. The diff/patch files contain source code corrections for faults 
discovered after the software was released. By manual inspection of those files we 
were able to extract information to understand and classify software faults. From 
those diff/patch files, a total of 668 faults were analyzed. Table 1 presents a summary 
of the programs used in this study. It is worth noting that these programs encompass a 
broad range of program types: both user programs (including interactive and 
command line programs) and operating system (Linux kernels) were used. 
 
Table 1 – Source of the field data 
P rog ram
s
S ource 	  location Description #	  faults
CDEX http://s ourceforge.net/projects /cdexos / CD	  Digital	  audio	  data	  extractor. 11
Vim http://www.vim.org Improved	  vers ion	  of	  the	  UNIX	  vi	  
editor.
249
F reeC iv http://www.freec iv.org Multiplayer	  s trategy	  game.	   53
pdf2h http://s ourceforge.net/projects /pdftohtml/ pdf	  to	  html	  format	  trans lator. 20
GAIM http://s ourceforge.net/projects /gaim/ All-­‐in-­‐one	  multi-­‐protocol	  IM	  c lient. 23
J oe http://s ourceforge.net/projects /joe-­‐editor/ Text	  editor	  s imilar	  to	  Words tar® 78
ZS NES http://s ourceforge.net/projects /z s nes / S NE S /S uper	  F amicom	  emulator	  
for	  x86.
3
Bash http://cnswww.cns .cwru.edu/~chet/bas h/bas
htop.html
GNU	  P roject's 	  B ourne	  Again	  
S Hell.
2
L Kernel tp://www.kernel.org L inux	  kernels 	  2.0.39	  and	  2.2.22 93
F irebird http://s ourceforge.net/projects /firebird/ C ros s -­‐platform	  RDBMS 	  engine 2
MingW http://www.mingw.org/ Minimalis t	  GNU	  for	  Windows 	  	   	   	   	   60
S cummV
M
http://s ourceforge.net/projects /s cummvm Iterpreter	  for	  adventure	  engines 74
Tota l	  faults	  collec ted 668
 
 
The total number of faults collected for each program is dependent on the program 
age, maturity and the user community size. Some of the programs (e.g. Bash) are in a 
mature phase and have few recent faults; other programs (e.g. VIM) are still in the 
maturation phase and have a large user community that provides many fault reports. 
The notion of fault requires the notion of correctness. Generally speaking, the 
software is correct if it conforms to the user needs, as specified in the software 
requirements. However those might be wrong. For the purpose of this work, it was 
assumed that the requirements and specification are correct. Thus, a software fault 
means that the code is not correct somehow (i.e., it does not implement the 
specification in some particular aspect) because the code does not contain the 
instructions that should have.  
The approach used to analyze and classify the faults was the following: 
1. First we classified the faults according to the Orthogonal Defect 
Classification scheme (ODC) [3,4]. The use of general and well accepted 
fault classification is the best way to make our results available for the 
research community and it allows us to compare our results with previous 
field studies.  
2. In a second step we grouped the faults in each ODC class according to the 
nature of the defect, defined from a building block programming point of 
view. That is, for each ODC class a software fault is further characterized 
by one or more programming language constructs that is either missing, 
wrong or in excess. Programming language constructs may be statements, 
expressions, function calls, etc. A fault may then fall in one of three 
possible types: Missing construct, Wrong construct, and Extraneous 
construct. This is very relevant to fault emulation/injection since 
emulating an omission (missing construct) is substantially different from 
emulating a wrong construct (e.g., erroneous expression).  
3. In a last step, faults were further described and grouped into specific 
types. Each type is defined according to the language construct and 
program context surrounding the fault location. This description 
refinement is also particularly relevant for fault injection purposes since it 
helps a) the identification of suitable locations in the target code, and b) 
the code modifications necessary to emulate a given fault type.  
The resulting final classification can be viewed as an extension to ODC and is used 
to define fault emulation operators (each operator emulates one specific type of 
faults). 
2.2 ODC classification and general analysis 
According to the Orthogonal Defect Classification, a software fault is characterized 
by the change in the code that is necessary to correct it, i.e., to put the code consistent 
with the specification, which is assumed to be correct in our case. From the list of 
ODC types, the following are directly related to the code and relevant to our work: 
• Assignment: value(s) assigned incorrectly or not assigned at all. 
• Checking: missing or incorrect validation of data and conditional statements, 
wherever these checks and conditions may appear (e.g., an incorrect loop 
condition). 
• Interface: errors in the interaction among components, modules, device 
drivers, functions calls, and similar. 
• Timing/serialization: missing or incorrect serialization of shared resources. 
• Algorithm: incorrect or missing implementation that can be fixed only by 
(re)implementing an algorithm or data structure without the need of a design 
change. 
• Function: affects a sizeable amount of code and refers to capability that is 
either implemented incorrectly or not implemented at all. 
As field data available to us did not include any information on timing or 
serialization properties, we did not consider the Timing/serialization ODC type. The 
mapping of the faults into one of the remaining ODC types was straightforward with 
the exception of the Function type which required a more detailed analysis of the code 
in order to figure out whether the correction of the fault has required a design change 
or not. Due to the decentralized nature of the software development methodology of 
open source projects, we didn’t have direct information on redesign decisions, which 
forced us to a more detailed analysis of the faults identified as candidates for the 
Function ODC type. Table 2 presents the distribution of faults across the five ODC 
fault types addressed in this work. 
One interesting topic to both the theme of field-based works and to the theme of 
software faults is the comparison of our results with other available field studies that 
also used ODC to classify field-discovered faults. We compared our fault distribution 
with the one presented in [2] as that work is the one most closely related to our own. 
Because that work included Time/Serialization faults, we removed that particular type 
from the comparison and normalize all the percentages leaving so that a direct 
comparison could be made. Table 2 presents this comparison (values shown in 
parenthesis are those from [2] after normalization. 
 
 
Table 2 – Fault distribution across ODC types. 
ODC 	  type #	  faults
As s ignment 143 21.4 (	  21.98	  )
C hecking 167 25.0 	  (	  17.48	  )
Interface 49 7.3 (	   	   	  8.17	  )
A lgorithm 268 40.1 	  (	  43.41	  )
F unction 41 6.1 	  (	   	   	  8.74	  )
ODC 	  distribution	  (%)
 
 
It is relevant that both our data and that presented in [2] show the same trend in the 
fault distribution across ODC fault types: Assignment faults have approximately the 
same weight as Checking faults; Interface and Function faults are clearly the less 
frequent ones; and Algorithm are the dominant faults. All ODC classes have 
approximately the same weight in both works. The fact that independent research 
works obtained a similar fault distribution suggests that this distribution is 
representative of programs in general and gives us confidence in our results. Also, the 
programs analyzed in [2] (large database and operating system code) were quite 
different from the ones used in our study, suggesting that this fault distribution across 
ODC types is reasonably independent from the nature of the program. Although more 
field studies should be conducted to consolidate this conclusion, these results suggest 
that fault injection experiments should take this fault distribution trend into 
consideration to improve representativeness.  
Table 3 presents the fault distribution observed for each individual program used in 
this study. To observe a trend in fault distribution across programs, only those 
programs with a significant number of faults should be considered (the number of 
faults is presented in the first row). Nevertheless, we decided to show the results for 
all the programs. We observed that the programs with a higher number of faults show 
a similar ODC fault distribution; the only observed deviation was presented by "Joe" 
program, which had more checking faults than the global trend. This trend existing 
across programs reinforces the suggestion that software faults do follow a clear 
pattern of distribution across ODC types. 
 
Table 3 – Fault distribution across ODC types by individual programs 
CDEX Vim FC iv Pdf2h GAIM J oe ZS NES Bas h L Kernel FireBird MingW
S c umV
M Tota l
11 249 53 20 23 78 3 2 93 2 60 74 668
As s ignment 18.2	  % 	   21.3	  % 	   11.3	  % 	   55	  % 	   4.3	  % 	   25.6	  % 	   66.7	  % 	   100	  % 	   22.6	  % 	   50	  % 	   10	  	  	  	  % 	   24.3	  % 	   21.4	  % 	  
C hecking 18.2	  % 	   22.5	  % 	   13.2	  % 	   5	  % 	   52.2	  % 	   44.9	  % 	   0	  	  	  	  % 	   0	  % 	   25.8	  % 	   50	  % 	   38.3	  % 	   8.1	  % 	   25	  	  	  	  % 	  
Interface 54.5	  % 	   6.4	  % 	   7.5	  % 	   0	  % 	   4.3	  % 	   14.1	  % 	   0	  	  	  	  % 	   0	  % 	   5.4	  % 	   0	  % 	   5	  	  	  	  % 	   4.1	  % 	   7.3	  % 	  
Algorithm 9.1	  % 	   44.6	  % 	   52.8	  % 	   40	  % 	   26.1	  % 	   15.4	  % 	   33.3	  % 	   0	  % 	   33.3	  % 	   0	  % 	   46.6	  % 	   56.8	  % 	   40.1	  % 	  










2.3 Extended classification and discussion 
For the purpose of fault injection the fault types provided by ODC are not practical 
as they are too broad, meaning that many different faults fall in the same type and the 
types themselves lack the fine details required by an automated tool to be able to 
reproduce the fault in the target code. Clearly, further refining is needed, not in the 
sense of an alternative classification but as an additional detail layer to ODC. As 
explained in section 2.1, we propose to achieve this extra layer by analyzing faults 
from the point of view of the (program) context in which fault occur and relate the 
faults with programming language constructs. Using this notion, a defect is then one 
or more programming language constructs that are either missing, wrong or in excess. 
A construct is any building block of the traditional programming languages: 
statements, expressions, function calls, etc. Following this idea, we classified each 
fault according to its nature which can be one of these: Missing construct, Wrong 
construct, or Extraneous construct. Although this classification is orthogonal to ODC 
and can be used alone (as is in Table 4), we used it as an extension to ODC fault types 





Table 4 – Fault distribution by fault nature. 
F ault	  nature CDEX Vim FCiv Pdf2h GAIM Joe ZSNES Bash LKernelFirebirdMingW ScumVM Total ( % )
Mis s ing	  cons truct 3 157 35 11 17 34 1 0 63 2 45 61 429 (	  64.2	  	  % 	  )
Wrong	  cons truct 8 85 18 9 6 41 2 2 24 0 14 12 221 (	  33.1	  	  % 	  )
E xtraneous 	  cons truct 0 7 0 0 0 3 0 0 6 0 1 1 18 (	  2.7	  	  % 	  )
 
 
As we can see in Table 4, faults of the extraneous nature are clearly less frequent 
than the other two. This was an expected result, as programmers are more prone to 
forget to put something in the program, or to put it in a wrong way, than to insert 
surplus code. We can also see that missing programming constructs seem to be the 
dominant type of software fault. From the point of view of representativeness for fault 
injection experiments, this information is valuable.  
Table 5 presents the total number of missing, wrong or extraneous faults for each 
of the five ODC fault types addressed in this study. We also provide some examples 
of fault to help the reader understand what kind of fault is included in each type (this 
will be detailed further on). As we can see from Table 5, there are once again trends 
that we can use to achieve representativeness in the injection of software faults, e.g., 
for the assignment and interface types, missing program construct faults are less 
frequent than the wrong construct faults. 
 
Table 5 – Fault nature totals across ODC types. 
ODC 	  
type
Nature Ex amples #	  faults %	  of	  tota l
Mis s ing A variable was not as s igned a value, a variable was not initializ ed,
etc
62 9.3	  	  %
Wrong A	  wrong	  value	  (or	  expres s ion	  res ult,	  etc )	  was 	  as s igned	  to	  a	  variable	   70 10.5	  	  %
E xtraneous A	  variable	  s hould	  not	  have	  been	  s ubject	  of	  an	  as s ignment 11 1.6	  	  %
Mis s ing An "if" cons truct is mis s ing, part of a logical condition is mis s ing,
etc
113 16.9	  	  %
Wrong Wrong logical expres s ion us ed in a condition in brach and loop
ons truct	  (if,	  while,	  etc .)
53 7.9	  	  %
E xtraneous An	  "if"	  cons truct	  is 	  s uperfluous 	  and	  s hould	  not	  be	  pres ent 1 0.1	  	  %
Mis s ing A parameter in a function call was mis s ing; incomplete expres s ion
was 	  us ed	  as 	  param.
11 1.6	  	  %
Wrong Wrong information was pas s ed to a function call (value, expres s ion
res ult	  etc )
38 5.7	  	  %
E xtraneous S urplus data is pas s ed to a function (e.g. one parameter too many
in	  function	  call)
0 0	  	   	   	   	  %
Mis s ing S ome part of the algorithm is mis s ing (e.g. function call, a iteration
cons truct,	  etc )
222 33.2	  	  %
Wrong Algorithm	  is 	  wrongly	  coded	  or	  ill-­‐formed 40 6	  	   	   	   	  %
E xtraneous The	  algorithm	  has 	  s urplus 	  s teps ;	  A 	  function	  was 	  being	  called	   6 0.9	  	  %
Mis s ing New	  program	  modules 	  were	  required	   21 3.1	  	  %
Wrong The	  code	  s tructure	  has 	  to	  be	  redefined	  to	  correct	  functionality 20 3	  	   	   	   	  %


























We then further detailed the description of faults describing exactly what 
constructs were missing, wrong or extraneous. We did this for all ODC types and 
obtained a reasonable small list of fault types (for each ODC type). This is an 
interesting result, as we do not want a small list of generically-described faults where 
many faults fit and for which no practical tool can emulate those faults due to lack of 
details, and we also do not want a long list of over-detailed description where each 
fault fits into and only into its own type, rendering any effort of representativeness 
useless. The complete list of fault types for all ODC types is outside the goal of this 
section and chapter. We present here in table 6 the list of faults for the ODC type 





Table 6 – Detailed analysis of algorithm faults. 
F ault	  
nature
















































Mis s ing	  function	  call	  (MFC ) 28 7 1 1 5 4 2 23 71
Mis s ing	   If 	  cons truct	  plus 	  s tatements 	  (MIF S ) 27 10 1 15 15 12 80
Mis s ing	  if-­‐els e	  cons truct	  plus 	  s tatements 	  (MIES ) 4 3 7
Mis s ing 	  if 	  cons truct	  plus 	  s tatements 	  plus 	  els e	  before	  s tatements 	  (MIEB ) 1 10 4 2 1 18
Mis s ing 	  if 	  cons truct	  plus 	  else 	  plus 	  s tatements 	  around	  s tatements 	  (MIEA) 2 1 3
Mis s ing	  iteration	  cons truct	  around	  s tatement(s )	  (MCA) 1 1
Mis s ing	  cas e:	  s tatement(s )	   ins ide	  a	  switch	  cons truct	  (MCS ) 1 1
Mis s ing	  break	  in	  cas e	  (MBC ) 3 1 4
Mis s ing	  small	  and	  localiz ed	  part	  of	  the	  algorithm	  (ML PA) 9 4 2 1 1 5 1 23
Mis s ing	  s pars ely	  s paced	  parts 	  of	  the	  algorithm	  (ML PS ) 5 1 6
Mis s ing	  large	  part	  of	  the	  algorithm	  (ML P L ) 3 1 1 3 8
Wrong	  function	  called	  with	  s ame	  parameters 	  (WFCS ) 1 2 6 9
Wrong	  function	  called	  with	  different	  parameters 	  (WFCD) 9 1 3 13
Wrong	  branch	  cons truct	  -­‐	  goto	  ins tead	  break	  (WBC1) 1 1 2
Wrong	  algorithm	  -­‐	  small	  s pars e	  modifications 	  (WAL D) 4 1 1 6
Wrong	  algorithm	  -­‐	  code	  was 	  mis placed(WAL R ) 5 3 1 9




E xtraneous 	  function	  call	  (EF C ) 4 2 6





Tota l	  faults	  found
 
The faults listed in Table 6 are now described with a level of detail that is useful 
for practical fault injection. For example, the type MFC – missing function call refers 
to the omission of a call to a routine in the program. This is an easy understandable 
description that can be easily emulated into the target code. Another important issue is 
the identification of suitable location where a given fault can be injected. Using the 
MFC fault type again, it is relatively easily to identify occurrences of function call in 
the target, even in the binary code. It is worth noting that this study was part of an 
effort to devise and implement a fault injection technique able to inject realistic 
software fault directly into the binary code of the target, without requiring source 
code (goal that was achieved). This scenario is relevant because many fault injection 
applications involve common-of-the-shelf components for which there is no source 
code available. 
To help readers understand the level of details that is now used to describe faults, 
we use another example from table 6. Fault MIFS – Missing if construct plus 
statements. This fault refers to the omission of a conditional statement deciding if a 
givel (small) block of statements is executed. In C language it is something like 
 
If (cond) { statement1; statement2; …. }  
 
Once again the identification of this type of construct is easily identifiable in the 
target code and easily emulated through modification in said code. One very 
important aspect of the information in Table 6 is the number of occurrences for each 
fault type. The two fault types described here are much more common than other 
types (e.g., MIEA). This is a very important information to build representative 
faultloads for fault injection experiments. Table 7 presents a global view of all the 
occurrences for all fault types (all ODC types and programs). 
 
 




The information summarized in Table 7 is very relevant. It offers two conclusions 
about software faults: 
• There is a relatively small set of fault types that is responsible for a large 
portion of all the fault occurrences. The 12 fault types in Table 7 put together 
are responsible for 50% of all the faults discovered in this field study. 
• There are faults that are clearly more frequent than others, and this 
information is important to build representative faultloads for fault injection 
scenarios. 
The results of this field study are very interesting for research on software faults 
and for the injection of software faults. It offers insight on fault details aimed at the 
realistic emulation of faults, it offers information about the distribution of the most 
common type of faults in the operational scenario aimed at generating representative 
faultloads, and is the basis of the G-SWFIT technique for fault injection. These results 
and this technique have been used on several research works (e.g., [5,6,7]), and the 
classification scheme is used as basis for different application areas (still related to 
software faults), such as security (e.g., relate vulnerabilities with its root cause faults). 
To conclude the presentation of this field study we present here one example of a 
software fault as classified and described in this field study (Figure 1), and one 




Description %. observed  ODC classes 
MIFS Missing "If (cond) { statement(s) }" 9.96 % Algorithm 
MFC Missing function call 8.64 % Algorithm 
MLAC Missing "AND EXPR" in expression used as branch condition 7.89 % Checking 
MIA Missing "if (cond)" surrounding statement(s) 4.32 % Checking 
MLPC Missing small and localized part of the algorithm 3.19 % Algorithm 
MVAE Missing variable assignment using an expression 3.00 % Assignment 
WLEC Wrong logical expression used as branch condition 3.00 % Checking 
WVAV Wrong value assigned to a value 2.44 % Assignment 
MVI Missing variable initialization 2.25 % Assignment 
MVAV Missing variable assignment using a value 2.25 % Assignment 
WAEP Wrong arithmetic expression used in parameter of function call 2.25 % Interface 
WPFV Wrong variable used in parameter of function call 1.50 % Interface 
 Total faults coverage 50.69 %  




Figure 1 – Example of a diff/patch file (excerpt). In this example, the patch applies a 
“&& !eap->skip” that was missing. The fault type is MLAC - Missing "AND EXPR" in 
expression used as branch cond. 
 
*** 4858,4864 ****
for (p=name; isalpha(*p) || isdigit(*p) || *p == '_'; ++p)
;







for (p=name; isalpha(*p) || isdigit(*p) || *p == '_'; ++p)
;









Figure 2 – Operator to emulate a fault OMIEB - missing if construct and the 
statements surrounded by it plus an else statement. It is not one of the most common 
fault types, but it serves to illustrate the changes at the high level code and its related 
modification at low level to emulate the fault, as well as search pattern used to 
identify suitable fault locations.  
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2.4 Considerations on the case study 
In this case study a large number of software faults were analyzed to improve the 
knowledge about the nature of software faults: its nature, the frequency of its 
occurrence frequency by fault types, and how they can be emulated through fault 
injection. The contributions of this case study were a fault classification scheme 
allowing practical injection of software faults and the knowledge about the fault 
distribution across fault type as they occur in the operational scenario. The source of 
the data was a set of open-source programs, without which this study would have 
been much harder if not impossible: in closed-source projects, the information 
regarding faults and their correction is kept within the development team. As the 
correction of faults (patch code) was directly used to conduct this field study, we 
stress the importance of having data available for research purposes, even in closed-
source projects. This data can hardly be used for commercial purposes, and, excepting 
issues related to security, a concerted effort should be made by academia to try and 
obtain data such as the one used for this study. This effort should be articulated with 
the creation of data repositories to help spreading the data and results of field data 
studies. 
3   Case Study 2: Field data on Security Vulnerabilities 
In this section we present the results of a field study on the most common 
vulnerabilities, which provides a truthful body of knowledge on real security 
vulnerabilities that accurately emulate real world security problems. The data was 
obtained by analyzing past versions of representative web applications with known 
vulnerabilities that have already been corrected. The main idea is to compare the 
piece of defective code with the corrections made to secure it. This code change (or 
the lack of it in the vulnerable application) can be viewed as the reason for the 
presence of the vulnerability. Note that this methodology can generically be used in 
other field studies to obtain the characterization and distribution of the source code 
defects that originate vulnerabilities in web applications. 
The field study uses data from 655 SQL Injection and XSS security patches of six 
widely used web applications. The detailed analysis of the code of the patches shows 
that web application vulnerabilities result from software bugs affecting only a 
restricted collection of statements, which greatly facilitates the emulation of 
vulnerabilities through fault injection, as the effort can be concentrated on the 
emulation of vulnerabilities in a small number of types of statements. 
Section 3.1 and 3.2 describe the methodology used to collect the field data in this 
field study. Section 3.3 presents the systems addressed in the study, and the 
vulnerabilities addressed are presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 details the 
information gathered in the study and the results are presented in Section 3.6. Section 
3.7 summarizes this case study. 
3.1   Vulnerability analysis and classification methodology 
When web application vulnerabilities are discovered, software developers correct the 
problem releasing application updates or patches. In our study, we used these patches 
to understand which code is responsible for security problems in web applications. 
With this approach, we can classify the code structures that cause real security flaws 
and identify the most frequent types of vulnerabilities observed in the web 
applications considered in our field study. 
For each web application under test, the methodology to classify the security 
patches is the following: 
1. Verification of the patch to obtain the right version of the web application 
where it applies. We need to confirm the availability of the specific version of 
the web application and obtain it for the rest of the process. It is mandatory to 
have both the patch and the vulnerable source code to be able to analyze what 
code was fixed and how, unless the patch file has all this information (which 
we found to be unusual). 
2. Analysis of the code with the vulnerability and compare it with the code after 
being patched. The difference between the vulnerable and the secure piece of 
code is what is needed to correct the vulnerability. This is what the software 
developer should have done when he first wrote the program and this is what 
we have to classify. 
3. Classification of each code fix that is found in the patch. The absence of the 
actions programmed in the patch represents what causes the vulnerability. For 
example, if the patch replaces the variable $id with intval($id)1, we 
consider that the vulnerability is caused by the absence of the intval 
function in the original code. To be accurate, we followed the patch code 
analysis guidelines described in the next section. 
4. Loop through the previous steps until all available patches of the web 
application have been analyzed. 
3.2   Patch code analysis guidelines 
Web applications are developed using different coding practices and during the 
classification of the security patches we face different scenarios and have to make 
some decisions that need to be clarified. To avoid classification mistakes and 
misinterpretations the following guidelines are followed: 
1. We assume that the information publicly disclosed in specialized sites is 
accurate and that the fix developed by the programmer of the patch and made 
available by the company that supports the web application solved the stated 
problem. We do not test the presence of the vulnerability nor confirm its 
correction. 
2. To correct a single vulnerability several code changes may be necessary. This 
way, each code change was considered as a singular fix. For example, suppose 
that two functions are needed to properly sanitize a variable. Missing any of 
                                                            
1 The intval is a PHP function that returns the numeric value of a variable, or 0 on error. 
these functions makes the application vulnerable, so both of them must be 
taken into account. In this case, if we want to simulate the vulnerability, we 
may remove any of the singular fault type fixes. 
3. When a patch can fix several vulnerability types simultaneously, each one is 
accounted separately. This occurred naturally because we analyzed each 
vulnerability independently, as if we were doing several unrelated analyses, 
one for each vulnerability type. For example, this occurs when a not properly 
sanitized variable is used in a query (e.g. allowing SQL Injection) and later on 
is displayed on the screen (e.g. allowing XSS). When this variable is properly 
sanitized, both vulnerabilities are mitigated simultaneously, however this 
situation accounts for the statistics of both XSS and SQL Injection 
vulnerabilities. 
4. When a particular code change corrects several vulnerabilities of the same 
type, each one is considered as a singular fix. For example, suppose that the 
value assigned to a specific variable comes from two sources of external 
inputs; and the variable is displayed in one place without ever being sanitized. 
We consider that the application has two security vulnerabilities because it can 
be attacked from two different inputs. However, to correct the problem all that 
is needed is to sanitize the variable just before it is displayed. In this example 
we consider that two security problems have been fixed, although only one 
code change was needed. 
5. A security vulnerability may affect several versions of the application. This 
happens when the code is not changed for a long time, but it is vulnerable. The 
patch to fix the problem is the same for all versions, and therefore it is 
considered to be only one fix. 
By following the previous guidelines, it was possible to classify almost all the code 
fixes analyzed. However, in some situations, patching one or more vulnerabilities 
may involve so many changes, including the creation of new functions or a change in 
the structure of the overall piece of code, that it is too difficult to classify it properly. 
These situations are usually associated with major code changes involving 
simultaneously security and other bug fixes related to functional aspects. These 
occurrences were quite marginal (5.4%) and were not considered in our study because 
they are too complex and difficult to analyze due to the lack of source code 
documentation. 
3.3   Web applications analyzed 
One mandatory condition for our field study is to have access to the source code of 
the web applications under analysis. The code of previous versions and the associated 
security patches must also be accessible. The other mandatory condition is the 
availability of information correlating the security fix and the specific version of the 
web application. 
The goal is to be sure that it is possible to access the source code (including the 
code of older versions) in order to be able to analyze and understand the security 
vulnerability and how it was fixed. Actually, the way a given vulnerability is fixed is 
a key aspect in the classification of the fault type originating the vulnerability. 
For the present study we have selected six LAMP (Linux, Apache, MySQL and 
PHP) web applications: PHP-Nuke [8], Drupal [9], PHP-Fusion [10], WordPress [11], 
phpMyAdmin [12] and phpBB [13]. These are open source web applications that 
represent a large community of users and, fortunately, there is enough information 
available about them to be researched. Additionally, they represent a large slice of the 
web application market and have a large community of users: 
• Drupal (winner of the first place at the 2007 and 2008 Open Source CMS 
Award), PHP-Fusion (one of the five winner finalists at the 2007 Open Source 
CMS Award) and phpBB (the most widely used Open Source forum solution 
and the winner of the 2007 SourceForge Community Choice Awards for Best 
Project for Communications) are Web Content Management Systems (CMS). 
A CMS is an application that allows an individual or a community of users to 
easily create and administrate web sites that publish a variety of contents. 
• PHP-Nuke is a well-known web based news automation system built as a 
community portal. PHP-Nuke is one of the most notorious CMS and it has 
been downloaded from the official site over 8 and half million times. 
• WordPress is a personal blog publishing platform that also supports the 
creation of easy to administrate web sites. It is one of the most used blog 
platforms in the World. 
• phpMyAdmin is a web based MySQL administration tool. It is one of the most 
popular PHP applications, is included in many Linux distributions, and was 
the winner of the 2007 SourceForge Community Choice Awards for Best Tool 
or Utility for SysAdmins. 
The six web applications analyzed are so broadly used since several years ago that 
they have a large number of vulnerabilities disclosed from previous versions, which 
were the subject of analysis of the field study. It is important to emphasize that a 
single vulnerability opens a door for hackers to successfully attack any of the millions 
of web sites developed with a specific version of the web application. Furthermore, it 
is common to find a single vulnerability in a specific version that also affects a large 
number of previous versions. The overall situation is even worse because web site 
administrators do not always update the software in due time when new patches and 
releases are available. 
3.4   Security vulnerabilities studied 
In the present work we focus on two of the most critical vulnerabilities in web 
applications: XSS and SQL Injection. A Cross Site scripting (XSS, but also known as 
CSS) vulnerability allows the attacker to inject HTML and/or a scripting language 
(usually JavaScript) into a vulnerable web page [14]. A SQL Injection vulnerability 
allows the attacker to tweak the input fields of the web page in order to alter the query 
sent to the back-end database [15]. 
Exploits of these vulnerabilities take advantage of unchecked input fields at user 
interface, which allows the attacker to change the SQL commands that are sent to the 
database server (SQL Injection), or allows the attacker to input HTML and a scripting 
language (XSS). Two main points account for the popularity of these attacks: 
• The easiness in finding and exploiting such vulnerabilities. They are very 
common in web applications and within a web browser the attacker can probe 
for these vulnerabilities tweaking GET and POST variables that are available 
in the HTML page. The building of an exploit for fun or profit can be a bit 
more time consuming, but there are plenty information and guides on how to 
do it (e.g. look at [16, 17] for XSS and [16,18,19] for SQL Injection, just to 
mention a few). 
• The importance of the assets they can disclose and the level of damage they 
may inflict. In fact, SQL Injection and XSS allow attackers to access 
unauthorized data (read, insert, change or delete), gain access to privileged 
database accounts, impersonate another user (such as the administrator), 
mimicry web applications, deface web pages, get access to the web server, 
malware injection, etc. [20]. 
3.5   Patch code sources 
For all the applications analyzed, we collected the source code of both the 
vulnerable and the patched versions. By comparing these two versions, we could 
understand the characteristics of the vulnerability and classify what code was changed 
to correct it. 
Software houses and developers follow their own policies in what concerns the 
public availability of older versions of the software, particularly when they have 
security problems. In some cases, they can be hard to find and even the access to the 
past collection of vulnerability patches can be a cumbersome task. Furthermore, most 
security announcements publicly available are so vague that it is too difficult (or even 
impossible) to know which source files of the application are affected by a particular 
vulnerability. Moreover, some of the disclosed information about security problems is 
too generic and groups together several types of security vulnerabilities (e.g., using 
the same document to refer to directory traversal, remote file inclusion and COOKIE 
poisoning vulnerabilities), which makes it more difficult to map our target 
vulnerabilities to the code fixing them. 
In order to gather the actual code of security patches, we have to use several 
sources of data, such as mirror web sites, other sites that provide the source code 
(mainly on blogs or forums), online reviews, news sites, sites related to security, 
hacker sites, change log files of the application, the version control system repository, 
etc. 
For the purpose of this study, we just need the changes made to the code of the 
application correcting the vulnerability problem (i.e., the source code of the entire 
application is not required). However, as there is no standard way of providing the 
data about the security vulnerability fix, different sources of information have to be 
considered, each one following its own specific format. The four main source types 
used in the current work are the following: 
1. Security patch files with information about the target version of the 
application. In this case, we have the reference to the buggy version of the web 
application and to the patch file that must be applied to mitigate the target 
vulnerability. 
2. Updated version of the web application. Actually, this is a completely new 
version of the application containing new features and bug fixes (including 
security ones). This is the most common source of information we have found, 
but it is also the one that needs more exploration work to be done. 
3. Available security diff file. In this case, there is a diff file, which is a file 
containing only the code differences between two other files with information 
about what lines of the original file have been removed, added or changed. It 
has, therefore, the precise code changes needed to fix a referenced 
vulnerability. 
4. Version control system repository. Almost all relevant open source 
applications are developed using a version control system to administer the 
contributions of the large community of developers from around the world. 
This is the most complete source of information we can have about the 
application, although it may be difficult to find what we are looking for in 
such a vast collection of files and versions. 
Once the vulnerable code and the respective patch are obtained using one of the 
previous sources of information, a differential analysis is performed to identify the 
locations in the code where the defects are fixed. This operation is done mainly 
through the use of diff utility. The Unix diff utility is a file comparison tool that 
highlights the differences between two files using the algorithm to solve the longest 
common subsequence problem [21]. A manual analysis of the code can be also 
performed when the output of the diff utility is too complex due to a large number of 
changes between the two versions of the source code, or when many corrections are 
done in the same file. The manual analysis also helps grouping several security 
corrections and discarding the code changes not related to security issues. 
3.6   Field study results and discussion 
In the field study we classified 655 XSS and SQL Injection security fixes found in the 
six web applications analyzed (PHP-Nuke, Drupal, PHP-Fusion, WordPress, 
phpMyAdmin and phpBB). We followed a classification scheme based on the 
software fault classification proposed in [1] and adapted the fault types specific to 
XSS/SQL injection (e.g., MFC to MFCext). 
The overall distribution of the fault types found in the six web applications 
analyzed is shown in Table 8. In this table we can see the individual results for each 


























































MFCext. 120 133 4 39 6 13 6 94 1 51 3 27 76% 
WPFV 31   3 2 5    4  1 7% 
MIFS 5 2  2 7 6    10  2 5% 
WVAV 2   3    2  4  17 4% 
EFC     1     1  4 1% 
WFCS    3 1 1  13     3% 
MVIV  1   1 3      4 1% 
MLAC    1 2 4    2   1% 
MFC    2 1     1   1% 
MIA    1  1       0% 
MLOC  1           0% 
ELOC    1         0% 
Total 
Faults 158 137 4 55 21 33 6 109 1 73 3 55 100% 
              
A common belief is that vulnerabilities related to input validation are mainly due to 
missing if constructs or even missing conditions in the if construct. However, our 
field study shows that this is not the case, as the overall “missing IF…” fault types 
(MIFS and MIA: see Table 8) only have a weight of 5.5%. As for the “missing 
<condition>…” fault types (MLAC and MLOC), they represent only 1.52% of all the 
fault types. This suggests that programmers typically do not use if constructs to 
validate the input data, and this may occur due to the complexity of the validation 
procedures needed to avoid XSS and SQL Injection. 
The typical approach we found in the field is the use of a function to clean the 
input data and let it go through, instead of stopping the program and raise an 
exception (or show an error page). This may be understood as a design goal trying to 
prevent the disruption of the interaction of users to the least possible. In what 
concerns security, it would be better to allow only inputs known as correct (white list) 
as this prevents any input with suspicious characters to go any further and is more 
secure than just cleaning the input from malicious characters and let the operation 
continue normally. 
Analyzing the global distribution of web applications vulnerabilities we found 
70.53% of XSS and 29.47% of SQL Injection showing that XSS is the most frequent 
type by far. As shown, all the fault types account for XSS vulnerabilities but only 
eight fault types report to SQL Injection, which might help justify the fact that XSS is 
more prevalent than SQL Injection, confirming the results of the IBM X-Force® 2008 
Trend & Risk Report [22]. This trend is also confirmed by vulnerability reports 
disclosed in CVE [23, 24]. However, the four fault types that do not contribute to 
SQL Injection (MFC, MIA, MLOC and ELOC) only account for 1.22% of all the 
fault types. Obviously, we do not have enough sample values to conclude that SQL 
Injection may not be derived from one of these fault types. We can only say that we 
did not find them in our field study. 
There are several factors that contribute to the prevalence of XSS. XSS is easier to 
discover because it manifests directly in the tester web browser window. Every input 
variable of the application is a potential attack entry point for XSS, which is not the 
case for SQL Injection, where only variables used in SQL queries matter. Another 
factor that contributes to the prevalence of XSS is that SQL Injection alters the 
database records and this cannot be always seen in the interface, at least so explicitly 
as XSS. Moreover, the knowledge needed to test for XSS [16, 17] is not as complex 
as for SQL Injection, for which the attacker needs to have deep knowledge about the 
SQL language. Although the SQL language is usually based on the SQL-92 standard 
[25], every database management system (DBMS) has its own extensions and 
particularities [16, 18,19], that need to be taken into account when searching for SQL 
Injection.  
The most representative and widespread fault type is the “Missing function call 
extended (MFCext.)”. It represents 75.87%  (140 SQL Injection + 357 XSS out of 655 
vulnerabilities studied) of all the fault types found. The high value observed for the 
MFCext fault type comes from the massive use of specific functions to validate or 
clean data that comes from the outside of the application (user inputs, database 
records, files, etc.). In many cases, functions are also used to cast a variable to a 
numeric value, therefore preventing string injection in numeric fields. 
The next three most common fault types are “wrong variable used in parameter of 
function call (WPFV)”, “missing IF construct plus statements (MIFS)”, and “wrong 
value assigned to variable (WVAV)”.  
A recurring problem is that, looking at several versions of the same program, we 
frequently found the same regex string being slightly updated as new attacks are 
discovered. These situations were found in WPFV and WVAV faults. 
Excluding the faults types already discussed (MFCext., WPFV, MIFS and 
WVAV), the remaining fault types correspond to only 7.63% of the security 
vulnerabilities found. These fault types are EFC, WFCS, MVIV, MLAC, MFC, MIA, 
MLOC and ELOC. 
3.7   Considerations on the case study 
In this case study we presented a methodology for characterizing the most frequent 
fault types associated with the most common web application vulnerabilities based on 
a field study. We focused on XSS and SQL Injection vulnerabilities of six widely 
used web applications, using 655 security fixes as the field data. Results show that 
only a small subset of 12 generic software faults is responsible for all the XSS and 
SQL Injection vulnerabilities analyzed. 
One relevant outcome of the field study performed is referred to the distribution of 
vulnerabilities by a reduced number of fault types. In fact, we observed that a single 
fault type, the MFCext. (missing the function responsible for cleaning the input 
variable), is responsible for about 76% of all the security problems analyzed. Previous 
studies on software fault types [1,2] also show this large dependency on a few bug 
types. Furthermore, this trend is not new in the security area: Microsoft has already 
stated that fixing the top 20% of the reported bugs eliminates around 80% of errors 
[26] and the Gartner Group reported that 20% of security test rules uncover 80% of 
errors [27]. This concentration of the responsibility of most vulnerabilities on just a 
few fault types can be very important to address the web applications security and 
makes it feasible to emulate vulnerabilities by means of fault injection, which has 
already been started to be addressed by the research community [28,29,30,31,32]. 
4   Overview of data repositories 
Data repositories are an excellent resource to store and share information for research 
purposes. One type of valuable information that can be shared through data 
repositories is the result from field data studies. Although data repositories to store 
failure data and dependability experiments results are relatively rare (especially 
considering the huge value of real failure data to help designers in improving 
computer systems), several initiatives have been proposed and are currently available. 
The Data & Analysis Center for Software (DACS) is a Department of the US 
Defense Information Center supporting research on software reliability and quality. It 
serves as centralized source for data related to software metrics. The DACS maintains 
the Software Life Cycle Experience Database (SLED). This repository is intended to 
support the improvement of the software development process. The SLED is 
organized into nine data sets covering all phases and aspects of the software lifecycle 
([33] and [34]). Examples of these datasets are: 
• The DACS Productivity Dataset (collected from government and private 
industry sources). This dataset consists of data on over 500 software 
projects and is mainly oriented to software cost modelling and productivity 
analysis [35]. The data represents software from early 60s to early 80s and 
includes software projects ranging from avionics to off-the-shelf packages. 
The information in this dataset includes the following: size of project, 
effort, language, schedule, errors. 
• The NASA/SEL Dataset (contributed by the Software Engineering 
Laboratory (SEL) at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center). This repository 
maintains data on avionic applications since 1976. The dataset is available 
by request on disk and it can be accessed through web browser. Using the 
latter, users have access to analytical summaries including linear regression, 
scatter plots and histograms. The analytical results are created dynamically 
per request during the HTTP session and served to the user browser. The 
repository information is stored in a relational database and the link 
between the data repository and the web server is supported through Perl 
applications. 
• The Software Reliability Dataset (collected at Bell Laboratories) [36]. This 
repository describes failures in a wide range of application domains 
including real time, control, office, and military applications. This dataset 
was primarily aimed at the validation of software reliability models and to 
assist software managers to monitor and predict software tests. As in the 
NASA/SEL dataset, the information can be obtained by request, and it can 
also be accessed through web interface. 
The Metrics Data Program (MDP) Repository is a database maintained by the 
NASA Independent Verification and Validation facility [37]. The repository is aimed 
at the dissemination of non-specific data to the software community and it is made 
available to the general public at no cost. All the data available in the repository are 
sanitized by the projects representatives, and all the necessary clearances are 
provided. Users of the repository are free to analyze the data for their specific 
research goals. 
The MDP repository is part of the MDP on-going effort to improve the ability to 
predict error in software by improving the quality of the problem data related to 
software (e.g., improve the quality of the information about the relationship of the 
error and the development phase). To this effort, the MDP recruits the participations 
of private-sector and public-sector projects. Recruited projects maintain complete 
control of data release and the level of participation in the program. The effort 
required by the participating projects is minimal. The repository contains data on the 
software projects that were collected and validated by the MDP program, spanning 
more than 8 years and including more than 2700 error reports. The information stored 
in the repository consists of error data, software metrics data, and error data at the 
function/method level. The dataset enables data associations between products, 
metrics, and errors classified according to the Orthogonal Defect Classification 
(ODC) [3]. 
The Software Reference Fault and Failure Data Project [38] is maintained by the 
National Institute of Standards & Technology and is aimed at the development of 
metrology, taxonomy and repository for reference data for software assurance. The 
project maintains a repository on software fault data specifically aimed at helping 
industry protect against releasing software systems with faults and to help assess 
software systems quality by providing statistical methods and tools. The repository is 
available to the public upon request. The access to the information online allows users 
to view data and execute simple queries. Analytical and statistical use of the data is 
possible through a program developed within the project and available to the public 
(the EFFTool). 
The Computer Failure Data Repository (CFDR) is a public repository on computer 
failure data ([39] and [40]) supported by USENIX. The repository is aimed at the 
acceleration of the research on system reliability with the ultimate goal of reducing or 
avoiding downtime in computer systems. To this goal, the CDFR hopes to remove the 
main difficulty faced by researchers, which is the lack of reliable and precise 
information about computer failures. The CDFR repository is open to both obtaining 
and contributing data. The repository comprises nine independent data-sets focusing 
mainly on very large storage systems. The repository information covers many 
aspects, including: software failures, hardware failures, operator errors, network 
failures, and operational environment problems. The raw data are available to the 
public [40] through web interface. The project does not offer online capability for 
analytic and statistical data-processing. 
The AMBER Raw Data Repository [41] is a repository of field data and raw results 
from resilience assessment experiments. Its goal is to grant both the research and IT 
industry communities with an infrastructure to gather, analyze and share field data 
resulting from resilience assessments of systems and services, stimulating a better 
coordination of high quality research in the area, and contributing to the promotion of 
a standardization of resilience measurement, which will in turn have a positive impact 
in the industry. While experimental and field data repositories are recognizably 
fundamental for supporting the advance of research and the dissemination of 
knowledge, the research community still seems somewhat reluctant in embracing such 
enterprises. This repository aims to encourage acceptance from the community to 
share its data and promote the research involving several partners sharing data.. 
Publicly available vulnerability databases currently play a very important role in 
making the information on vulnerabilities available to researchers and have 
completely reshaped the way software vulnerabilities are reported and disseminated in 
recent years. Examples of popular vulnerability databases are the National 
Vulnerability Database [42] and The Open Source Vulnerability Database [43], which 
provide comprehensive reports about discovered software vulnerabilities including 
the nature of a vulnerability (its type, the component where it was located, the list of 
vulnerable system versions, its discovery date, and so on) and include examples on 
how to exploit it, as well as the patch or the workaround provided by system vendor 
to fix it (when available). Additionally, to alert users about the severity and security 
risk of reported vulnerabilities, these databases typically provide vulnerability impact 
and exploitability levels assigned by security advisors. These databases also provide a 
web-based interface that enables users to search vulnerabilities and browse a list of 
the vulnerabilities reported for a given system. 
5   Conclusion 
The case studies presented in the chapter allow drawing some conclusions on field 
measurements and field data studies. Although the focus of the chapter is software 
faults and security vulnerabilities, these conclusions apply to any type of 
measurement obtainable in the field. Important aspects that are self-evident are the 
representativeness of the measurements and results, the classification used to describe 
them and manipulate data, and the mechanisms to make data and results available to 
the research community and general public. 
Concerning data on the robustness of the computer-based systems, field data is 
mostly obtained from reports (bug reports, incident reports, security logs, and so on, 
depending on the nature of the incident). These reports are filed by the users and 
operators and are typically used by the system developers to solve the incidents and 
improve the system. 
Observations made in closed-source, proprietary systems are typically not available 
to the public. Observations originating from open-source systems are normally made 
available to the community (e.g., stored in a repository). However, these repositories 
are normally not oriented to a systematic storage and classification of the discovered 
faults and remedies. Instead they are the result of the accumulation of solution to 
problems resulting in a kind of logfile-like information about which problems were 
discovered (bug reports, many times repeated), and how were solved. The exception 
to this are the repositories maintained by researchers in the context of long-term 
research in large companies, such as IBM. These are good initiatives, but typically are 
very different from one another. It would be of great value to the research community 
to have information on software faults available in a systematized and uniform way. 
Repositories like the ones described in the chapter are good initiatives in that 
direction. 
Concerning security, the information pertinent to research is even harder to find 
than those about software faults. It is not the case of data availability (as it is for faults 
in closed-source systems). On the contrary, there is plenty of information. The major 
problem is that there is too much information, scattered and mostly repeated, and 
classified using different schemes. A given security issue may have been classified 
according to in scheme and given one value of severity, for instance, and in another 
repository, the same vulnerability may appear with a different description and 
different characterization. 
The usefulness of public repositories to the research communities is demonstrated 
by the existence of studies based on the information stored in publicly available 
repositories (e.g. [41]). Nevertheless, and in spite of the different repository initiatives 
already available, the raw data from the vast majority of research works on 
experimental dependability evaluation and on field failure data, among other 
examples, is not available in any repository. Hundreds of papers have been published 
but the raw data that have led to the final results presented in those papers is not 
available. Data repositories do seem a very promising initiative to provide the means 
to have a uniform description of raw data and results and make this information 
available to the public, and perhaps some more concerted effort should be placed 
towards creating and maintaining said repositories. One example among several is the 
AMBER repository, which was built specifically to share data among different teams.  
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